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Current methods to analyze the Internet’s router-level topology with paths collected using traceroute assume
that the source address for each router in the path is either an inbound or off-path address on each router. In
this work, we show that outbound addresses are common in our Internet-wide traceroute dataset collected by
CAIDA’s Ark vantage points in January 2020, accounting for 1.7% – 5.8% of the addresses seen at some point
before the end of a traceroute. This phenomenon can lead to mistakes in Internet topology analysis, such as
inferring router ownership and identifying interdomain links. We hypothesize that the primary contributor
to outbound addresses is Layer 3 Virtual Private Networks (L3VPNs), and propose vrfinder, a technique for
identifying L3VPN outbound addresses in traceroute collections. We validate vrfinder against ground truth
from two large research and education networks, demonstrating high precision (100.0%) and recall (82.1%
– 95.3%). We also show the benefit of accounting for L3VPNs in traceroute analysis through extensions to
bdrmapIT, increasing the accuracy of its router ownership inferences for L3VPN outbound addresses from
61.5% – 79.4% to 88.9% – 95.5%.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Traceroute is the primary method available for uncovering the Internet’s router-level topology, but
it presents insidious epistemological challenges. Traceroute is a essentially a hack that exploits
common router behavior. When a router discards a packet due to the expiration of the Time to
Live (TTL) field in the Internet Protocol (IP) packet header, it sends an Internet Control Message
Protocol (ICMP) Time Exceeded response packet to the originator of the dropped packet. When
routers respond to traceroute probes, the ICMP response contains a router interface IP address in
the source field, exposing an address used on the router. The traceroute tool exploits this behavior
by sending probes with incrementing TTL values toward a single destination, attempting to induce
responses from each router on the path from the source to the destination.
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Fig. 1. Traceroute observes a sequence of router interfaces between a Vantage Point (VP) and a Destination
(DST). Logically, the inbound interfaces face the VP, while the outbound interfaces face the the destination.
Most routers report the address of the interface that received the traceroute probe, known as the
inbound address, in accordance with common network operator expectations [64], even if the router
sends the response using a different interface. Other routers adhere to the specification in Request
for Comments (RFC) 1812 [22], which mandates that routers report the address of the interface that
transmits the ICMP response. If the route back to the source is not via the inbound interface, the
router will report an off-path address [33], as illustrated in Fig. 1. We do not expect, however, that a
source address in a traceroute response represents an interface that would have been used to forward
the probe toward its destination, known as the outbound interface. Internet routers rarely forward
a packet through the same logical interface that received the packet, as doing so could lead to a
forwarding loop. The conventional interpretation, that routers report inbound or off-path interface
addresses in response to TTL-expiring probes, functions as an axiom of traceroute analysis. Reliance
on this axiom, either explicit or implicit, pervades the literature [19–21, 30, 42, 45, 49, 50, 54, 61, 62].
In this paper, we show that when a probe would have traversed an L3VPN had the TTL not
expired, the router can report the address of the interface in the L3VPN it would have used to forward
the probe toward the destination. This behavior is not described in RFC documents or in router
manuals. Importantly, L3VPNs can mislead techniques [42, 49, 50] that infer which Autonomous
System (AS) operates a router. In 2018, a router AS ownership inference technique [42] was used by
Dhamdhere et al. to identify interdomain links, which they then measured for evidence of persistent
congestion suggesting a long-term mismatch between installed capacity and actual traffic [25]. In
2019, Yeganeh et al. used a router ownership inference technique to infer and geolocate Amazon’s
peering connections [68]. Accurate router ownership inferences could also improve discovery and
classification of critical or bottleneck routers and links [18, 34, 40, 65] whose failure could threaten
networks or geographic regions, and provide additional constraints for geolocation efforts.
We report the results of our effort to develop and validate a method to infer the presence of
outbound interfaces in traceroute paths primarily caused by L3VPNs. The key challenge that we
address is to distinguish outbound interfaces caused by L3VPNs from apparent outbound interfaces
caused by forwarding loops. While this might seem like a narrow contribution, outbound addresses
can potentially confound any traceroute analysis that relies on conventional traceroute assumptions.
This paper makes the following four contributions.
(1) We provide a detailed explanation of how network operators may use L3VPNs. In
§4 we describe L3VPN implementation and use in Internet networks, the phenomenon that causes
L3VPN routers to report the outbound interface address in response to TTL-expiring probes, and
how outbound addresses can mislead traceroute analysis.
(2) We present vrfinder, a novel technique for identifying L3VPN outbound addresses
in traceroutes.We use vrfinder to infer that 5.8% (IPv4) and 1.7% (IPv6) of the addresses seen in
the middle of traceroutes by CAIDA’s Archipelego measurement infrastructure in January 2020
were L3VPN outbound interfaces. We validate our inferences against ground truth from Internet2
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and REANNZ, two large research and education networks, with 100.0% precision and 82.1% – 95.3%
true positive rate in IPv4 and IPv6 traceroute collections.
(3) We extend bdrmapIT, the state-of-the-art for router ownership inferences, to ac-
count for L3VPNoutbound interfaces.We show that outbound addresses can confound bdrmapIT
by violating its traceroute semantic assumptions. Our improvements increase the accuracy of its
router ownership inferences for the two ground truth L3VPN networks, in IPv4 and IPv6, from
61.5% – 79.4% to 88.9% – 95.5%.
(4) We publicly release our code. To allow other researchers to find and account for outbound
addresses in their traceroute analyses, and support reproducibility, we publicly release our source
code [48].
2 RELATEDWORK
Researchers have put considerable effort into inferring router-level properties of networks to
understand aspects of Internet routing behavior, performance, and resilience. The Internet was not
designed with router-level measurement in mind, so researchers have used three different methods
to obtain the raw data for constructing router-level Internet topologies: (1) traceroute [54, 63],
(2) the Record Route IP option [28, 35, 61], and (3) Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP)
messages [51, 53]. Researchers and operators mostly use traceroute, since Record Route and IGMP
only apply in IPv4, and some network operators filter packets with IP options [28], or filter IGMP
packets [51]. However, using traceroute data to understand router-level paths is challenging.
Traceroute infers an IP path using a sequence of TTL-limited IP packets that each solicit an
ICMP Time Exceeded message, whose source address identifies an interface of a router in the
path. If the route between a source and a destination changes while traceroute is sending probes,
traceroute might report adjacencies between unconnected routers. Network operators can prevent
their routers from sending ICMP Time Exceeded messages, or filter classes of traceroute probes at
their network borders, resulting in incomplete traceroute paths.
An operator can configure Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) to hide router-level topology
from traceroute, confounding traceroute inferences because edge routers appear directly con-
nected [26]. These invisible MPLS tunnels can also create the false appearance of high degree
nodes [66].While MPLS can hide the middle of the network, the unexpected appearance of outbound
addresses in traceroute can obscure network interconnections. In this work, we observe outbound
addresses that are caused by a specific network configuration model (§4) and we introduce a method
to detect outbound addresses in traceroute (§5).
A router, by definition, has multiple interfaces, and it can embed any of its interface IP addresses
in the source address field of the ICMP response to a traceroute probe; an interface address might
be inbound, off-path, or outbound (Fig. 1). There has been a particular focus on off-path addresses
in the literature. In 2003, Hyun et al. reported that asymmetric routing might cause a router to
respond with an off-path address [33] from the address space of an off-path AS, but reported that
this was rare, often observed close to the traceroute destination, and caused by multi-homing. In
2013, Marchetta et al. [46] presented a method to infer off-path addresses using the IP Timestamp
option, reporting that most of the classified IP addresses in their data were off-path. In 2014,
Luckie et al. [41] found that most inbound interfaces were incorrectly classified by the technique
from Marchetta et al. [46] to be off-path. Off-path addresses fundamentally differ from outbound
addresses, as the former are the responding interface address, while an outbound address indicates
the interface used to continue forwarding the packet to the traceroute destination.
Conventional interpretations of traceroute paths assumed that routers do not report the outbound
address when responding to traceroute probes [19–21, 30, 42, 45, 49, 50, 54, 61, 62]. Some prior work
used the Record Route IP option to expose unseen outbound addresses for routers encountered in
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192.0.2.0/24 via i3 192.0.2.0/25 via i5
0.0.0.0/0 via i2
(a) src: 203.0.113.1, dst: 192.0.2.5





(192.0.2.5 matches 192.0.2.0/25 on R2)
(192.0.2.135 matches 0.0.0.0/0 on R2)
Fig. 2. A class of forwarding loop. 𝑅2 announces 192.0.2.0/24 to 𝑅1, but only has an internal route for
192.0.2.0/25 and a default route to 𝑅1. Packets matching addresses in 192.0.2.0/25 will be forwarded
towards the destination, but packets matching addresses in 192.0.2.128/25 will match the default route on
𝑅2 and loop between 𝑅1 and 𝑅2.
traceroute paths. In 2008, Sherwood et al. [61] attempted to remove errors common in traceroute
analysis by aligning traceroute and Record Route paths. In 2010, Katz-Bassett et al. [35] used Record
Route to discover the reverse path between an arbitrary traceroute source and destination. In
2017, Goodchild et al. [28] suggested that Record Route provides useful information when used in
TTL-expiring probes, opening up potential new uses for Record Route. We show (§4.2) that some
routers expose the outbound address in response to traceroute probes due to L3VPNs.
Because a router can embed an addresses from any of its interfaces, different traceroutes can
observe different IP address aliases of the same router. Researchers have developed many alias
resolution techniques to infer which IP addresses belong to the same router [24, 29, 37, 43, 60, 63].
Because alias resolution techniques rely on heuristics and implementation artifacts, not all IP
addresses can be resolved for aliases.
Attributing which AS operates a given router is challenging, particularly for routers that connect
to other ASes, as a neighbor AS could provide the router address that traceroute observes. In 2010,
Zhang et al. [69] found that the canonical IP2AS mapping can result in false interdomain link
inferences from traceroute data. Since 2016, three techniques emerged to infer network boundaries
and interdomain links from traceroute. MAP-IT [50] used iterative constraint satisfaction to infer
router ownership and interdomain links from a traceroute dataset. Concurrently, bdrmap [42] used
heuristics to map the border of a network hosting a traceroute vantage point. Most recently, Marder
et al. synthesized bdrmap and MAP-IT to develop bdrmapIT [49], the current state-of-the-art in
mapping routers observed in traceroute to their AS operators. In this work, we show that L3VPN
outbound addresses can cause bdrmapIT to draw mistaken AS operator inferences, and we develop
a method to detect and mitigate their effects on bdrmapIT’s inferences.
Analysis by Xia et al. [67] found that roughly half of the forwarding loops in their 2005 traceroute
dataset resulted from networks failing to configure null routes for unused parts of their address
space. Fig. 2 shows a class of persistent forwarding loop commonly found at the edge of the Internet
where border routers may have a default route to their provider, and internal routes that cover
only a portion of the address space they announce to their provider. When a router receives a
packet to an unused portion of internal address space, the destination address may match a default
route and return via the router interface that received the packet. In 2017, Lone et al. [39] used
detection of these persistent forwarding loops to infer networks that did not deploy source address
validation (SAV) to filter packets with spoofed source IP addresses; in Fig. 2 𝑅1 should discard
packets with source address 203.0.113.1 because the address is not valid for that attachment point,
i.e., does not match a route via 𝑖3. In 2018, Ruth et al. [58] confirmed that persistent forwarding
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Path E: observe address on inbound interface on R1, outbound interface on R2, no response from R3
i
6
Fig. 3. Intuition and challenges in inferring outbound addresses in traceroute paths. We infer a candidate
outbound address on 𝑅2 when we observe an inbound address in the same subnet on adjacent router 𝑅3
(Path C). If 𝑅3 replies with an off-path or outbound address (Path D), or if 𝑅3 does not reply at all (Path E),
we cannot infer that 𝑅2 used an outbound address because we rely on observing an inbound address in the
same subnet on an adjacent router.
loops appeared regularly in Internet-wide ZMap scans. In this work, we show that forwarding
loops present challenges for outbound IP address inference in traceroute paths.
3 INTUITION AND CHALLENGES
The Internet is assembled by connecting routers that speak IP. These connections are either point-
to-point between two routers, or point-to-multipoint between many routers that exchange traffic
using a shared fabric, such as at an Internet Exchange Point (IXP). Because IPv4 addresses are scarce
resources, point-to-point connections in IPv4 are typically numbered out of a /30 or /31. In IPv6,
operators most commonly address point-to-point links from /64, /126, and /127 subnets [31, 38, 59],
although they may use any subnet size between 64 and 127. Host addresses, i.e., addresses usable as
interface addresses, are consecutive addresses for /30, /31, /126, and /127 subnets. While there is no
such guarantee for /64 subnets, current best practice is to assign consecutive addresses to the point-
to-point link interfaces [70]. Fig. 3 illustrates these concepts using three routers interconnected
with addresses assigned from IPv4 /30 subnets.
As discussed in §1 and §2, current methodologies that use traceroute paths typically assume that
traceroute observes mostly inbound addresses, with some off-path addresses. Fig. 3 illustrates two
expected traceroute observations in these cases (Paths A and B). Because traceroute paths mostly
observe inbound addresses, our intuition is that we may infer the presence of an outbound address
when it is followed by an inbound address, as these addresses will be part of the same subnet. In
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Path F: observe inbound address on R1,















Path G: observe inbound address on R1,
and R3, and the same outbound address on R2



























192.0.2.26Path J: observe inbound address on R1 and R2,
off-path on R3, and then inbound on R4. R4 does not forward
the packet back to R3 because R4 performs source address validation.
Path H: observe inbound address on R1,
R2, R3, and then R2 again. R2 does not forward











Fig. 4. Challenges in inferring outbound addresses in traceroute paths in the presence of forwarding loops.
The loops can manifest in traceroute in different ways, depending on the configuration of the routers.
Fig. 3 Path C, 𝑅2 replies with outbound address 192.0.2.13 and 𝑅3 replies with inbound address
192.0.2.14 – consecutive addresses in 192.0.2.12/30. In this section we introduce the primary
challenges to our method of identifying outbound addresses in traceroute paths: adjacent routers
that do not reply with an inbound address (§3.1) consecutive subnets (§3.3), forwarding loops (§3.2),
and IXP public peering (§3.4).
3.1 Adjacent Router does not reply with an Inbound Address
Our approach requires that the router following an outbound address replies with its inbound
address, but it might reply with an off-path address instead. If 𝑅3 replies with the off-path address
192.0.2.25 (Fig. 3 Path D), then we will not infer that 𝑅2 used an outbound address when it replied
with 192.0.2.13 because the addresses are not consecutive (a false negative). If 𝑅3 does not reply
at all, as illustrated by Path E in Fig. 3, then we will also not infer 𝑅2 used an outbound address.
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Fig. 5. Challenges in inferring outbound addresses in traceroute paths in the presence of consecutive addresses
from consecutive /31 subnets. 192.0.2.5 could be assigned to 𝑅2 and incorrectly inferred as an outbound
address within 192.0.2.4/30 or correctly inferred as an inbound address within 192.0.2.4/31.
3.2 Forwarding Loops
Forwarding loops between adjacent routers can also complicate inferences of which addresses in
the traceroute are inbound, off-path, or outbound. When a traceroute path contains an address
cycle, where an IP address repeats with at least one other address between the two occurrences,
current practice in the research community is to truncate the traceroute path at the first occurrence
of the repeated address to avoid traceroute anomalies due to forwarding loops. Paths F, G, and H in
Fig. 4 show traceroute paths that expose consecutive IP addresses contained in the same subnet
(192.0.2.12/30) – a necessary condition for our method to infer the presence of an outbound
address. In Path F, 𝑅2 uses the IP address of the inbound interface as the source address in ICMP
responses, whereas in Path G, 𝑅2 responds with the IP address of the outbound interface toward the
destination. Because the loops in Paths F and G manifest similarly in traceroute output as a repeated
IP address in the path separated by an address in the same /30 subnet, they are difficult to distinguish.
Truncating path G at the first occurrence of a repeated address (192.0.2.13) would mean we could
not infer that 𝑅2 is using an outbound address because we no longer have a consecutive address
(192.0.2.14) at the adjacent hop.
Similar to Path F, in Fig. 4 Path H 𝑅2 uses the IP address of the inbound interface as the source
address in ICMP responses. Unlike Path F, 𝑅2 in Path H performs SAV [23, 27], so it discards
subsequent traceroute packets because the source addresses of these probes is not valid for that
attachment point (§2). Despite the forwarding loop, the SAV process on 𝑅2 prevents the traceroute
path from containing a repeated address, and although the adjacent addresses 192.0.2.14 and
192.0.2.13 belong to the 192.0.2.12/30 subnet, 192.0.2.14 is not an outbound address. We can
detect the presence of a forwarding loop in Path H if we can infer that 𝑅2 appeared twice using
alias resolution techniques, i.e., 192.0.2.10 and 192.0.2.13 belong to the same router. However,
alias resolution techniques can produce false negatives because they rely on router implementation
artifacts that are not present on all routers, and some routers are unresponsive to alias resolution
probe packets.
Path J in Fig. 4 shows another case where we might mistakenly infer an outbound address. In
that traceroute, 𝑅3 responds using the off-path address of the interface facing 𝑅4, and forwards
subsequent packets to 𝑅4, resulting in consecutive addresses in 192.0.2.24/30. 𝑅4 does not forward
subsequent probe packets back to 𝑅3 because 𝑅4 discards them using SAV. Like Path H, we might
incorrectly infer that the penultimate hop 𝑖8 is an outbound address.
3.3 Consecutive Subnets
Some consecutive addresses that appear in traceroute could either belong to consecutive two-
address subnets (i.e., IPv4 /31s or IPv6 /127s) or a single four-address subnet (i.e, an IPv4 /30 or an
IPv6 /126). If an operator assigns IP addresses from consecutive /31 subnets to routers that appear
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Path M: observe address on inbound interface on R1, R2, R3, R4,





Fig. 6. Challenges in inferring outbound addresses in traceroute paths when crossing an IXP, where traceroute
no longer observe consecutive addresses even when a router uses an address on an outbound interface (Path
L). Some consecutive addresses from the same IXP subnet do not indicate outbound addresses (Path M).
in sequence in a traceroute path, we may observe consecutive addresses that appear to be part of
a /30 subnet. In Fig. 5, Path K reveals the inbound addresses 192.0.2.5 and 192.0.2.6 on routers
𝑅2 and 𝑅3. These addresses could fall within 192.0.2.4/30, suggesting that 𝑅2 might have used an
outbound address when sending an ICMP response, but in reality the addresses belong to separate
/31 subnets.
3.4 IXPs
Finally, this section has so far discussed point-to-point links, which connect exactly two routers.
IXPs connect many routers using a point-to-multipoint peering fabric, where the IXP operator
provides a subnet containing many addresses that allows many routers to interconnect. Path L in
Fig. 6 shows that the usual heuristic of detecting an outbound address by observing consecutive
addresses no longer holds – 𝑅2 responds using outbound address 203.0.113.4 and 𝑅3 responds using
inbound address 203.0.113.8 – because the routers use addresses assigned from the 203.0.113.0/24
subnet with 254 usable addresses. To capture outbound addresses at IXP peering routers, we rely
on CAIDA’s external dataset of IXP prefixes [16] that contains self-reported IXP prefixes collated
by PeeringDB [9], and prefixes learned by routers participating in public peering collated by Packet
Clearing House (PCH) [8] and Hurricane Electric (HE) [6]. Instead of looking for addresses from the
same point-to-point subnet, we look for adjacent addresses from a subnet used for public peering
at the same IXP. However, these datasets are incomplete because they either require the IXP or a
participant to register the subnet with PeeringDB or have a route collector from PCH or HE present
at the IXP. Furthermore, the issues of an adjacent router not responding with an inbound address
in the same subnet, that we discussed in a point-to-point subnet context (Fig. 3), also apply to IXP
subnets.
Path M in Fig. 6 shows a more challenging issue: a series of routers might all respond with their
inbound addresses, but we observe addresses from the same IXP subnet consecutively in traceroute,
which would usually indicate that the first router used an address from an outbound interface to
reply. This scenario can occur when the AS operating 𝑅2 (AS #A) is a peer of the AS operating 𝑅3
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Fig. 7. A service provider with an L3VPN. 𝑆 backbone routers form the backbone. 𝑆𝐸 edge routers connect
the backbone to edge routers in other networks. Interfaces labeled 𝑖 connect to the DFN, while 𝑣 interfaces
are part of the L3VPN. 𝑆𝐸 routers have two forwarding tables, one for the DFN and one for the L3VPN.
(AS #B), the AS operating 𝑅4 (AS #C) is a customer of AS #B, and #A and #C do not peer. In this
scenario, the path between ASes #A and #C crosses the IXP peering fabric twice, so we observe
multiple inbound addresses from the IXP subnet.
4 BGP/MPLS LAYER 3 VPNS
Before explaining the traceroute phenomenon caused by L3VPNs, it is important to understand
why networks implement L3VPNs and how L3VPNs work. Primarily, L3VPNs allow networks
to maintain separate virtual networks using a single physical infrastructure. In service provider
networks, L3VPNs typically share a single MPLS backbone. Packets are tunneled across the backbone
by encapsulating them with an MPLS header containing a label that signals to backbone routers
the path a packet will take. Packets in different L3VPNs might travel in the same MPLS tunnels.
Crucially, each virtual network maintains its own Virtual Routing and Forwarding (VRF) tables,
keeping traffic in one L3VPN logically separate from other L3VPNs, even if they include the
same physical router. Common uses for L3VPNs in service provider networks include enforcing
complex routing policies, enabling reliable and high bandwidth connections to third-party services,
connecting geographically distributed customer sites, and providing carrier-of-carrier services [15].
Other types of networks, such as enterprise networks, might also employ L3VPNs. Enterprise
L3VPNs often do not use a shared MPLS backbone, instead running on regular IP links. Cisco
refers to these L3VPNs as VRF Lite deployments, and Juniper calls them Virtual-Router Routing
Instances. In our experiments on a Juniper switch and a Cisco switch, neither switch reported the
outbound address in response to traceroute probes when configured with these lightweight versions
of L3VPNs. In this paper, the L3VPN and VRF terms refer exclusively to MPLS/BGP L3VPNs and
the VRFs that support them.
4.1 L3VPN Implementation Over MPLS
The most common implementation of L3VPNs in service provider networks relies on an MPLS
backbone to connect the service provider’s edge routers, and uses BGP to propagate routes as
described primarily in RFCs 2547 [56] and 4364 [57]. Both the Cisco and Juniper router implemen-
tations adhere to the RFC specifications [4, 14], representing most deployments in service provider
networks.
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ingress edge router egress edge routerbackbone router
Fig. 8. When forwarding a packet from Router B to Router C, 𝑆𝐸2 pushes two MPLS labels: a VPN-ID label,
and a backbone label. 𝑆2 decides how to forward the packet (to 𝑆𝐸3) using only the backbone label, and pops
the backbone label because 𝑆2 is the penultimate hop in the tunnel. 𝑆𝐸3 determines the forwarding table for
the packet using the VPN-ID label, pops the VPN-ID label, and forwards the packet to 𝐶 .
Fig. 7 shows an L3VPN in a service provider network, where the service provider uses an MPLS
backbone comprised of routers 𝑆1 and 𝑆2 to connect its edge routers 𝑆𝐸1, 𝑆𝐸2, and 𝑆𝐸3. Each of these
service provider edge routers connects to a router operated by a different network, in addition to
connecting to the MPLS backbone. Here, the service provider added an L3VPN to enforce policies
that dictate which connected networks are allowed to exchange traffic using the service provider’s
routing infrastructure. To accomplish this, the service provider logically partitions the network
into the Default Forwarding Network (DFN), and the L3VPN.
In this example, the service provider’s L3VPN uses the same physical routers as the DFN, but
they maintain separate forwarding tables and routing policies using two building blocks. First, each
𝑆𝐸 router maintains a VRF table to separate the L3VPN routes from the default forwarding table
(§4.1.1). Second, packet labels allow traffic from both the DFN and L3VPN to traverse the shared
backbone, while providing sufficient information for edge routers to implement network policy
(§4.1.2).
4.1.1 Virtual Routing and Forwarding. The first building block is the ability to create VRF tables,
which function like default routing and forwarding tables. Each edge router in an L3VPN maintains
a VRF table specific to that VPN. To preserve routing separation, VRF tables on a router do not
share routes with other VRF tables or with the default forwarding table, unless explicitly configured
to leak certain routes to other routing tables. Fig. 7 shows this separation, where edge router 𝑆𝐸3
has two forwarding tables. The first table is the DFN table, which exists regardless of whether the
router participates in an L3VPN. DFN tables contain routes to support the MPLS tunnels, such as
the 𝑆𝑃 route, and might also include routes to other networks, like the AS #A and AS #C routes.
Unlike the DFN table, 𝑆𝐸3’s VRF table contains only routes to edge routers in the same L3VPN
(𝑆𝐸2) and networks connected to the L3VPN (AS #B and AS #C). If an L3VPN packet arrives at
𝑆𝐸3, and the L3VPN VRF at 𝑆𝐸3 does not contain a route to the packet’s destination, 𝑆𝐸3 will not
look up the destination in the DFN table. This behavior preserves routing separation between the
L3VPN and the DFN.
4.1.2 Packet Forwarding. The second building block lets edge routers distinguish between L3VPN
and DFN packets when both traverse a shared MPLS backbone. Essentially, when a packet enters
the service provider over an L3VPN link, the edge router pushes a VPN identifier (VPN-ID) onto the
packet. If the next hop requires tunneling the packet across the MPLS backbone, the edge router
also pushes a backbone label on top of the VPN-ID.
As seen in Fig. 8, when ingress edge router 𝑆𝐸2 receives a packet over the L3VPN link, 𝑆𝐸2 looks
up the next hop in the VRF. Before forwarding the packet, 𝑆𝐸2 first pushes the VPN identifier onto
the packet, and then pushes the MPLS backbone label on top of it. As the packet is forwarded
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Fig. 9. A traceroute across the DFN from a VP in 𝐴𝑆𝐴 toward a destination in 𝐴𝑆𝐶 yields normal traceroute
output, where routers report inbound interface addresses. A traceroute across the L3VPN from a VP in 𝐴𝑆𝐵
yields outbound address 𝑣3 on router 𝑆𝐸3, instead of the inbound address 𝑖12 observed by the first traceroute.
toward 𝑆𝐸3, the backbone router 𝑆2 uses only the backbone label to determine the next hop. In
Fig. 8, 𝑆2 pops the backbone label before forwarding the packet, as 𝑆2 is the penultimate hop in the
path and the subsequent router does not need that label to make its forwarding decision.
Finally, when the L3VPN packet arrives at the egress edge router 𝑆𝐸3, 𝑆𝐸3 uses the VPN-ID
to distinguish L3VPN packets from DFN packets, and to differentiate among L3VPNs. 𝑆𝐸3 then
performs the next hop lookup in the VRF associated with the VPN-ID. In Fig. 7, 𝑆𝐸3 looks up the
packet in the L3VPN VRF, and forwards the packet through the VRF interface 𝑣3 to reach 𝐶 . It is
this lookup in the egress VRF that causes problems for traceroute analysis. If the TTL expires and
the egress edge router 𝑆𝐸3 sends an ICMP message, 𝑆𝐸3 reports the outbound interface address it
would have used to forward the packet in the ICMP message, instead of reporting the inbound or
off-path interface address that traceroute analysis typically assumes.
4.2 Impact on Traceroute
To show the impact of L3VPNs on traceroute output, we contrast a traceroute through a DFN with
a traceroute through an L3VPN.
4.2.1 Traceroute Through a DFN. The first example focuses on a traceroute through the DFN. In
Fig. 9a, a vantage point in AS #A sends TTL-expiring probes toward a destination in AS #C over
the DFN. When the first probe enters the service provider network, 𝑆𝐸1 decrements the TTL, drops
the probe, and responds with the inbound address 𝑖2. If the backbone routers 𝑆1 and 𝑆2 respond,
they also respond with their inbound addresses – 𝑖4 and 𝑖9, respectively. When the probes reach
𝑆𝐸3 without a VPN ID label, the next hop lookup uses the default forwarding table. Finally, both
𝑆𝐸3 and 𝐶 respond with their inbound interface addresses 𝑖12 and 𝑖14, as expected.
This example demonstrates the expected output when traceroutes traverse default forwarding
networks. Each responding hop reports the address of the interface that received the traceroute
probe. In reality, a router might report an off-path address if it responds through a different interface.
Regardless of whether the addresses correspond to inbound or off-path interfaces, no router in the
DFN responds with an outbound address from the traceroute destination’s side of the router.
4.2.2 Traceroute Through an L3VPN. The situation is different for the L3VPN. In Fig. 9b, a VP in 𝐵
sends traceroute probes to a host in 𝐴𝑆𝐶 across the L3VPN. The service provider ingress router 𝑆𝐸2
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(b) Incorrect topology inferred by bdrmapIT, which inferred 𝑅2 to be operated by Google.
R1i1 R2 i2 R3i3
Internet2 Google
(c) Underlying topology, where 𝑅2 is operated by Internet2.
Fig. 10. Traceroute segment that traversed an L3VPN leading to an incorrect AS operator inference, because
bdrmapIT assumed that 72.14.209.107 was an inbound address on 𝑅2.
recognizes that all of the probes belong to the L3VPN, so 𝑆𝐸2 responds to the first traceroute probe
with the inbound VRF address 𝑣2. The backbone router 𝑆2 responds as it would to traceroute probes
through the DFN, reporting the inbound address 𝑖10. When a traceroute probe’s TTL expires at the
egress edge router 𝑆𝐸3, rather than report the inbound address 𝑖12 or some other off-path address
in the ICMP response, 𝑆𝐸3 reports the outbound interface address 𝑣3, which is the interface that
𝑆𝐸3 would have used to forward the probe packet to its destination. Finally, router𝐶 responds with
its inbound address 𝑣4, representing the other side of that same IP link.
4.2.3 Real World Example. We demonstrate the potential problems caused by L3VPN outbound
address responses using traceroutes between December 24, 2019 and January 7, 2020 from 159
CAIDA Ark vantage points. We inferred router operators using the bdrmapIT approach [49].
These router ownership inferences provide an example of erroneous topology inference caused
by an L3VPN egress edge router reporting the address of its outbound interface. One example
was caused by the traceroute segment shown in Fig. 10a. bdrmapIT first mapped the addresses to
their originating AS numbers, correctly mapping the first address to Internet2 (AS11537), and the
remaining addresses to the Google (AS15169).
The problem for bdrmapIT, and for its predecessors bdrmap and MAP-IT, is that they rely on
the assumption that the reported addresses in traceroute either correspond to the inbound or an
off-path interface. bdrmapIT concludes that 72.14.209.107 identifies an inbound interface on 𝑅2
operated by Google, since the alternative unlikely explanation is a link between Internet2 routers
𝑅1 and 𝑅2 using Google IP addresses. This assumption leads bdrmapIT to incorrectly infer the
topology in Fig. 10b, where 72.14.209.107 is assigned to an interface on a Google router.
In reality, 72.14.209.107 identifies an interface on an Internet2 router used for the Internet2 Peer
Exchange (Fig. 10c). Internet2 implements this service as an L3VPN, separating the Peer Exchange
traffic from the traffic between its members that traverses its DFN. As a result, when the L3VPN
egress edge router responds to the traceroute probe, it reports the outbound address 72.14.209.107.
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This particular interface uses an address from Google’s address space, since it connects a Google
router to the L3VPN. We provide a solution to this mistaken inference in §6.4.
4.3 Discussion
Networks have used L3VPNs for many years, even in the public Internet, but to the best of our
knowledge, this outbound address phenomenon is unknown to the research community except
for a brief mention by Luckie et al. in 2016 [42]. The authors there mentioned the possibility of
outbound addresses in traceroute, but did not cite any documentation or consider limitations that
L3VPNs posed to their technique, leaving their approach just as susceptible to mistaken inferences
as the bdrmapIT technique. This behavior, where L3VPN egress edge routers report the outbound
address, is also not specified in any RFC or in official manuals. It does appear, however, in tutorials
and official forum answers from Cisco [52] and Juniper [13].
Despite strong evidence that Cisco and Juniper routers report L3VPN outbound addresses in
response to ICMP TTL-expiring probes, including confirmation from employees and observations
against our ground truth, it is possible that some routers respond differently. There might also be
scenarios where routers report outbound addresses when sending ICMP Time Exceeded messages
outside of L3VPNs, of which we are unaware. In this work, we identify outbound addresses
in traceroute responses. The more ambitious goals of discovering all instances of L3VPNs in a
traceroute collection, when the L3VPN egress edge router does not respond with its outbound
address, or disambiguating the causes of the outbound addresses, remains future work.
5 METHODOLOGY
In this section, we present vrfinder, a technique for identifying L3VPN outbound addresses in
traceroute. Our approach in vrfinder follows from the observation that outbound addresses typically
cause the appearance of addresses from the same IP subnet in a traceroute (§3) when the adjacent
router responds with an inbound address. vrfinder exploits this knowledge when trying to identify
outbound addresses in a traceroute collection. The first step (§5.1) builds a set of candidate outbound
addresses seen in the middle of traceroutes by looking for adjacent addresses that likely represent
the same point-to-point IP link. The second step (§5.2) prunes the candidates using additional
probing, IXP datasets, and router aliases. Finally, the third step (§5.3) uses additional traceroute
probing to identify outbound addresses among those addresses that only appear at the end of
traceroutes.
5.1 Finding Candidate Outbound Addresses
The first step tries to find candidate outbound addresses (COAs) in the middle of traceroutes, using
two heuristics. The first heuristic looks for adjacent consecutive addresses that may belong to the
subnet used to form a point-to-point link, the type of link generally used for interdomain links, and
by extension the types of L3VPN links used in service provider networks. As described in §3, IPv4
point-to-point links are usually addressed from either a /30 or /31 subnet [55]. IPv6 point-to-point
links are usually addressed from /64, /126, and /127 subnets [31, 38, 59], although operators may
use any subnet size between 64 and 127. We detect a candidate outbound address when we observe
the other address in an assumed subnet on the adjacent traceroute hop. The second heuristic looks
for adjacent addresses in traceroute that belong to the same IXP subnet; the address that appeared
first in traceroute is a candidate outbound address.
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5.2 Pruning Candidate Outbound Addresses
The goal of the second step is to distinguish COAs that are L3VPN outbound addresses from COAs
that are caused by consecutive subnets (§5.2.1), forwarding loops (§5.2.2), and inefficient forwarding
(§5.2.3).
5.2.1 Pruning Consecutive Subnets. Traceroute can expose addresses from consecutive subnets
that lead to adjacent consecutive addresses in traceroute output (§3.3). The goal of this step is to
identify traceroute-adjacent addresses that belong to different two-address subnets. In Path K in
Fig. 5, 192.0.2.6 could be a COA due to the adjacent address 192.0.2.5, and both addresses could
be contained in the 192.0.2.4/30 four-address subnet. In reality, 192.0.2.5 and 192.0.2.6 are from
two consecutive IPv4 /31 two-address subnets.
To prune these COAs, we examine the responsiveness of all addresses in a four-address subnet
(IPv4 /30 or IPv6 /126) whose address sequence in traceroute could imply a four-address subnet. If
we elicit a response from an unusable address, we infer the COA does not belong to a four-address
subnet. Returning to the example in Fig. 5, we ping the four addresses in the potential 192.0.2.4/30
subnet; if we receive a response from an unusable address, we conclude that the COA does not come
from a four-address subnet, and thus 192.0.2.6 likely belongs to a two-address /31 subnet, ruling
it out as a outbound address. If we receive responses from both usable host addresses, and none of
the unusable addresses respond, we retain our inference that the COA belongs to a four-address
subnet. There are three other possible test results.
First, we might receive a response only from the COA, which suggests that the candidate belongs
to a four-address subnet. If the COA belonged to a two-address subnet, we would usually expect the
COA’s router to use an address in the adjacent subnet and therefore respond to probes sent to that
address as well. For example, router 𝑅2 in Fig. 5 is assigned both 192.0.2.4 and 192.0.2.6, so if 𝑅2
replies to pings for 192.0.2.6, we would expect replies for pings to 192.0.2.4 as well. We therefore
classify this response pattern as a probable indication that the COA is an outbound address.
Second, we might receive a reply only from the other address in the assumed four-address
subnet, but not from the COA itself. Here, we cannot apply the same reasoning as before, because
there is no guarantee that the router with the other address in the subnet uses any other pinged
address, rendering the test inconclusive. Third, we might not receive a reply to any ping, once again
rendering the test inconclusive.
Aside from these inconclusive test results, the most important limitation of this pruning approach
is that we remove any COA when our ping test demonstrates it does not belong to a four-address
subnet, in keeping with our assumption that L3VPNs use point-to-point links to connect to other
networks. Occasionally, we might discard an outbound address that belongs to a point-to-multipoint
link with a subnet containing more than four addresses.
5.2.2 Pruning Forwarding Loops. Traceroute can expose forwarding loops that lead to adjacent
addresses from the same subnet in traceroute output (§3.2). The goal of this step is to distinguish
COAs caused by L3VPNs (Path C in Fig. 3) from router loops where we do not observe repeated
addresses (Path H in Fig. 4). This step does not consider COAs inside an address cycle, which exist
when an address appears multiple times in a single traceroute path with at least one other address
separating the repeated address (Paths F and G in Fig. 4). Our approach to resolving loops consists
of three heuristics, which we apply to COAs outside of an IXP.
Traceroute Test: First, we use a traceroute test to determine if the COA is observed in a
traceroute path toward the apparent inbound address that followed the COA. In order to confirm
the COA, the new traceroute path must terminate at the apparent inbound address and contain
a response from the COA at the hop immediately prior. If the new traceroute exposes a different
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Traceroute Test: targeting i7 exposes the outbound address i6, followed by the Echo Reply from i7.
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Fig. 11. The traceroute test can differentiate COAs caused by L3VPNs from those caused by incomplete
forwarding loops.
address at the penultimate hop, and appears to traverse the same AS to reach the apparent inbound
address, we reject the COA. We check that the new traceroute traverses the same AS as the original
traceroute to ensure that it did not reach the apparent inbound address via an alternate AS path,
potentially bypassing the L3VPN. Otherwise, the test is inconclusive.
Fig. 11 illustrates the approach, using two paths we previously discussed in §3. Path C in
Fig. 11 shows COA 192.0.2.13 appearing before 192.0.2.14, so we issue a new traceroute toward
192.0.2.14. Since this traceroute still exposes 192.0.2.13, we infer that the COA was actually
an outbound address and not an artifact of a forwarding loop. When we conduct the traceroute
test for Path H in Fig. 11, which contains a forwarding loop, we do not see the COA on 𝑅3 in the
path. Instead, the traceroute terminates at 𝑅2, which responds with 192.0.2.13. In this case the
penultimate hop 192.0.2.5 belongs to AS #A’s address space, as does the address that appeared
before COA in the original traceroute, allowing us to reject the COA. If 192.0.2.5 belonged to a
different AS address space, we could not confirm or reject the COA since the traceroute might have
taken different AS paths to 𝑅2 in the original and new traceroutes.
Alias Test: Second, because not all routers respond to probes addressed to them, we use an alias
resolution test to infer if the COA is an alias of a router that appeared earlier in the path, i.e., the
COA is part of a loop. For Path H in Fig. 11, if 192.0.2.10 and 192.0.2.13 were aliases, then we
infer there was a loop in the path and the COA 192.0.2.14 is not an outbound address. To infer
aliases, we use the MIDAR [37] and iffinder [36] probe-based alias resolution techniques, and the
Hoiho [43] DNS-based alias resolution technique.
Probable Loops: Third, because not all routers respond to traceroute probes addressed to them,
or support alias resolution, we use an analytic approach to infer if a COA is likely part of a loop.
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When a COA primarily appears inside of address cycles, we infer that the COA likely results from
a persistent forwarding loop.
5.2.3 Multiple IXP Hops. Traceroute can expose addresses from an IXP subnet that could either
be caused by an outbound address or inefficient forwarding (§3.4). We try to distinguish these
situations by comparing the AS that announces the addresses observed immediately prior to the
COA with the AS that operates the COA according to a mapping of IXP addresses to AS operators.
If the ASes are the same, or are siblings, the we infer the COA is an outbound address. Returning to
Path L in Fig. 6, we check if the AS assigned to the COA 203.0.113.4 is the same AS that originates
the longest matching prefix for 192.0.2.2; in Path L, this is AS #A. For Path M in Fig. 6, AS #B
operates the COA 203.0.113.8, while AS #A operates the prior address 192.0.2.10, so we infer
this path was caused by inefficient routing. If the IXP dataset does not have a mapping for an IXP
COA, the test is inconclusive.
5.3 Last Hop Probing
Some addresses in a traceroute collection never appear in the middle of a traceroute, i.e. when they
appear in a traceroute, they are always the last hop. This occurs for last hop addresses in a service
provider where subsequent routers in the connected networks do not respond to TTL-expiring
probes. This situation is uncommon for normal traceroute responses, since service provider border
routers often connect to multiple networks, one of which might respond to traceroute probes. The
likelihood increases, however, for outbound addresses that connect the L3VPN to one other network.
When that other network’s routers do not respond to TTL-expiring probes, the L3VPN outbound
address always appears at the end of traceroutes. In Path E of Fig. 3, the address 192.0.2.13 never
appears in the middle of a traceroute, so we could not identify it as a COA using this path alone.
We use additional probing to discover COAs when the other address in the subnet did not appear
in the traceroutes.
Traceroute collections might have many last hop addresses, so we only probe the most likely
candidates. Since an address can appear in the middle of traceroutes from one vantage point (VP)
but not from others, we collect the last hops from each VP, recording their prefix-to-AS mapping
and the destination ASes of their traceroutes. Service providers usually use their own subnets for
interconnections with their customers, so we remove any last hops with a destination AS that
matches its prefix-to-AS mapping. This keeps only the last hops most likely to indicate an AS
interconnection.
Next, we try to expose the other side of the IP link for each potential last hop outbound address.
For each potential last hop outbound address, we conduct a traceroute to the possible other addresses
in their two and four address subnets from the original VP. Using the example Path E from Fig. 3
with potential last hop outbound address 192.0.2.13, we conduct traceroutes to 192.0.2.12 and
192.0.2.14, as these traceroutes might elicit a response from 192.0.2.12 or 192.0.2.14, with the
potential last hop outbound address 192.0.2.13 appearing in the path immediately before. These
traceroute-adjacent addresses from the same subnet indicate a COA. Finally, we use the ping test to
confirm the new COA if we inferred it from a four-address subnet.
6 RESULTS
We evaluated vrfinder on the traceroute collections used for the January 2020 CAIDA ITDK [17].
The IPv4 collection consists of 475.8 M traceroutes collected by 159 VPs, and the IPv6 collection
has 237.2 M traceroutes collected by 69 VPs. The dataset also includes MIDAR [37] and iffinder [36]
alias resolution for IPv4, and provides DNS hostnames for the IP addresses seen in the IPv4 and IPv6
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traceroutes. We supplemented the alias resolution included in the ITDK using router identifiers
that Hoiho [43] inferred from the IPv4 hostnames.
We collected IXP public peering prefixes from CAIDA’s IXPs dataset [16]. The IXP dataset also
provided many individual IP addresses assigned to ASes at IXPs, required for pruning the IXP
COAs. We found AS assignments for 57.3% and 70.7% of the IPv4 and IPv6 IXP COAs respectively.
If an assigned address found in the dataset was not covered by an IXP prefix, then we added a /24
covering prefix for IPv4 addresses and a /64 covering prefix for IPv6 addresses. This added 200 to
the 1055 IPv4 prefixes and 100 to the 903 IPv6 prefixes.
Our IXP pruning heuristic also relies on AS address space and organizational information. We
inferred AS address space ownership using contemporaneous BGP route announcements collected
by RouteViews [12] and RIPE RIS [11], supplemented with additional prefixes found in RIR extended
delegation files [1–3, 7, 10]. CAIDA’s AS-to-organization dataset [5] provided a list of sibling ASes.
6.1 Running vrfinder
We ran vrfinder on the traceroute collections to identify L3VPN outbound addresses (Table 1). The
first step was generating the initial COA sets. vrfinder inferred more COAs from four-address
subnets than from two-address subnets (4.0x for IPv4 and 2.5x for IPv6) indicating four-address
subnets are more prevalent in service provider networks. The last hop probing added 1406 and 392
COAs to the IPv4 and IPv6 COAs respectively.
After creating the initial set of COAs, we began pruning with the ping test. We received sufficient
replies for a conclusive result in 89.9% of the IPv4 COA tests and 64.4% of IPv6 COA tests, removing
16.4% and 16.1% of those in IPv4 and IPv6 respectively. We kept the inconclusive COAs in the set of
L3VPN outbound addresses when presenting our results, since the ping test invalidated few of the
COAs with a conclusive result.
Next, we removed COAs mistakenly inferred due to forwarding loops. In IPv6, we removed 61.4%
of the remaining service provider COAs, while in IPv4 we only removed 12.9%. We suspect that
the higher number of unused address in IPv6 results in more forwarding loops that cause adjacent
consecutive addresses in traceroute. In fact, 8.7% of the traceroutes in the IPv6 collection result
in an address cycle, compared to 1.5% of the IPv4 traceroutes, supporting our theory that IPv6
traceroutes more often contain a forwarding loop than traceroutes in IPv4.
Finally, we pruned the IXP COAs, of which 56.4% and 71.8% in IPv4 and IPv6 respectively had an
AS assignment in the IXP dataset. Since we retained few of the IXP COAs with an AS assignment,
we removed any IXP COA without an AS assignment. Without knowing the AS assigned using the
IXP COA, we cannot differentiate between inefficient peering and L3VPN outbound addresses, so
we removed those COAs to avoid false inferences.
Of the addresses in the middle of traceroutes in the collection, the inferred L3VPN outbound
addresses accounted for 5.8% of the IPv4 addresses and 1.7% of the IPv6 addresses. These results
demonstrate the prevalence of L3VPN outbound addresses in the IPv4 traceroutes, and suggest that
L3VPN outbound addresses appear less frequently in the IPv6 traceroutes.
6.2 Validation Against Ground Truth
We validated our inferences against ground truth from Internet2 and REANNZ, two large research
and education networks (Table 2). Internet2 provided us with its Juniper router configurations, and
REANNZ provided us with their L3VPN addresses. Internet2 used its DFN to connect customers to
each other, and its L3VPN to connect its customers to transit providers and third party services.
Both the DFN and L3VPN addresses appeared in traceroutes, and the Internet2 router configurations
included both L3VPN and DFN addresses. REANNZ used L3VPNs to enforce routing policies, while
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IPv4 IPv6
Candidate outbound addresses
Service provider middle addresses 139,193 11,607
Service provider last-hop addresses 1,406 392
IXP middle addresses 1,002 529
Total COAs 141,601 12,528
Phase 1: Filter service provider four-address subnets
Confirmed: only usable addresses responded 79,619 56.6% 4,483 37.4%
Rejected: unusable address responded (16,544) 11.8% (888) 7.4%
Probable: only COA responded 4,939 3.5% 150 1.3%
Inconclusive: insufficient responses 11,350 8.1% 3,048 25.4%
Untested: two-address subnet COAs 28,147 20.0% 3,430 28.6%
Remaining service provider COAs 124,055 11,111
Phase 2: Filter service provider loops
Confirmed: traceroute test 67,586 54.5% 1,562 14.1%
Rejected: traceroute test (11,988) 9.7% (2,560) 23.0%
Rejected: alias test established loop (1,890) 1.5% (53) 0.5%
Rejected: candidate mostly in loops (2,152) 1.7% (4,214) 37.9%
Inconclusive: no loop information 40,439 32.6% 2,722 24.5%
Remaining service provider COAs 108,025 4,284
Phase 3: Classify IXP middle addresses
Confirmed: Inferred outbound 109 10.9% 89 16.8%
Rejected: Inferred inefficient routing (456) 45.5% (291) 55.0%
Inconclusive: no participant information (437) 43.6% (149) 28.2%
Total IXP outbound addresses 109 83
Outbound addresses inferred
Service provider middle addresses 106,619 3,892
Service provider last-hop addresses 1,406 392
IXP middle addresses 109 89
Total inferred outbound addresses 108,134 4,373
Table 1. The initial set of COAs, and number of COAs kept or (pruned) at each phase, and the number of
inferred outbound addresses. Phase 1 only prunes service provider COAs, Phase 2 only considers the service
provider COAs retained in Phase 1, and Phase 3 only prunes IXP COAs.
the DFN only supported the MPLS tunnels. As a result, all REANNZ addresses in the traceroute
collection belonged to L3VPNs.
Table 3 shows the results of our inferences compared to our ground truth as vrfinder added last
hop COAs and progressed through its pruning stages. The positive predictive value (PPV) indicates
the reliability of our positive L3VPN outbound address identifications. Here, a false positive is a
DFN address that vrfinder flagged as an L3VPN outbound address, so we only present PPV results
for Internet2. The true positive rate (TPR) provides the fraction of L3VPN outbound addresses in
the ground truth that vrfinder correctly detected.
The initial set of COAs suffered from both false detections and missing inferences. Unresponsive
routers caused all but one of the missing inferences for REANNZ, while 38.5% – 50.0% of the
Proc. ACM Meas. Anal. Comput. Syst., Vol. 4, No. 2, Article 40. Publication date: June 2020.
vrfinder: Finding Outbound Addresses in Traceroute 40:19
Dataset Description IPv4 IPv6
L3VPN Outbound Address Datasets
Internet2 VPN Internet2’s L3VPN outbound addresses. 172 130
REANNZ VPN REANNZ’s L3VPN outbound addresses. 63 26
Normal Inbound or Off-Path Address Datasets
Internet2 DFN Addresses in Internet2’s DFN. 196 155
Internet2 Neighbor Addresses on routers operated by Internet2 neighbors
used for interconnection with Internet2.
425 268
REANNZ Neighbor Addresses on routers operated by REANNZ neighbors
used for interconnection with REANNZ.
52 20
IXP IXP public peering addresses associated with a specific
participant AS in PeeringDB [9].
16,134 9,063
Regex Addresses with hostnames indicating the operating AS,
extracted using Hoiho [43] regular expressions.
782 137
Total 17,824 9,795
Table 2. The intersection of the addresses in the seven ground truth datasets and the traceroute collections.
We use the two L3VPN outbound address datasets to evaluate vrfinder (§6.2), and use all of the datasets
to ensure our extensions to bdrmapIT (§6.4) improve AS ownership inferences for the L3VPN outbound
addresses, and remain similar for the other datasets.
Internet2 REANNZ
IPv4 IPv6 IPv4 IPv6
PPV TPR PPV TPR TPR TPR
Initial candidate outbound addresses 93.1% 94.8% 95.0% 90.6% 83.1% 86.4%
Add last hop service provider addresses 93.2% 95.3% 95.2% 91.5% 83.6% –
Phase 1: Filter four-address subnets 97.6% – 96.0% – – –
Phase 2: Filter loops
Traceroute test – – 98.3% – – –
Alias test established loop 98.2% – 99.2% – 82.1% –
Candidate mostly in loop - – 100.0% – – –
Phase 3: Classify IXP middle addresses 100.0% 95.3% 100.0% 91.5% 82.1% 86.4%
Table 3. The true positive rate (TPR) through the different vrfinder stages for Internet2 and REANNZ. We
also present the positive predictive value (PPV) for Internet since the ground truth includes DFN addresses.
Internet2 missing inferences were also due to unresponsive routers. For the remaining missing
inferences, the router following the outbound address responded with addresses belonging to other
subnets, suggesting they were off-path.
Next, we probed to find outbound last hop addresses, which added new outbound inferences for
all but REANNZ IPv6. For the unidentified outbound last hop addresses, we either never probed
them, or never received a response from the subsequent router. The last hop probing did not add
any false L3VPN outbound inferences.
To address false detections among service provider COAs, vrfinder first used the ping test to
identify COAs incorrectly inferred to belong to four-address subnets, correctly identifying all eight
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invalid IPv4 COAs in Internet2’s DFN. Next, we tried to identify transient and persistent forwarding
loops. The traceroute test was inconclusive for most of the remaining false COAs, but correctly
rejected three incorrect COAs in Internet2 IPv6. Alias resolution identified additional router loop
COAs in all but REANNZ IPv6, and removing COAs primarily seen in address cycles correctly
removed a router loop COA in Internet2 IPv6. It also discarded a valid REANNZ IPv6 COA, since it
appeared in an address cycle nine times, but only once outside of a cycle. In the last pruning step,
vrfinder removed 3 false IXP address COAs in Internet2 IPv4.
Overall, vrfinder achieved 100.0% PPV and 82.1% – 95.3% TPR for our two ground truth datasets.
The missing inferences, especially for REANNZ, highlight the fact that vrfinder cannot identify
an outbound address when the subsequent router does not respond to traceroute or ping probing.
Finally, these results only include addresses that responded with either ICMP Time Exceeded or
Destination Unreachable error types, since traceroute interpretation typically expects routers to
report the inbound interface address. Including the ICMP Echo Replies in the evaluation reduced
the recall for Internet2 and REANNZ in IPv4 to 94.8% and 78.6% respectively, and to 88.8% for
Internet2 in IPv6.
6.3 Discussions with Network Operators
After developing all but the traceroute test of the vrfinder methodology, we spoke with network
operators at five large commercial ISPs and a European R&E network. We asked them about specific
vrfinder outbound address inferences from their IPv4 address space, looking for additional insight.
One operator at a global ISP tested our L3VPN outbound address assumption on the ISP’s network,
confirming that the L3VPN egress router always reported the outbound address. Another operator
at a transit provider in Oceania informed us that the ISP virtualizes nearly all of its topology,
and confirmed that the outbound inferences we sent belonged to VRFs. The R&E operator also
confirmed all but one of our outbound inferences for the R&E network.
However, operators at the other three ISPs told us that none of their L3VPNs should appear
in our traceroute collection. After sending them a sample of the original traceroutes that led to
the outbound inferences, they informed us that many of our mistaken inferences resulted from
traceroutes doubling-back toward the VP. Their routers, upon receiving the packet back from their
customers, responded to the first traceroute probe, but SAV discarded subsequent probes. In one of
the networks, transient route changes also appeared to account for some of the mistakes. These
conversations led us to create the traceroute test (§5.2.2), and suggest that vrfinder’s outbound
inferences might not be as accurate as the evaluation against ground truth indicates in §6.2.
6.4 Extending bdrmapIT to Account for L3VPN Outbound Addresses
To show the potential benefits of accounting for L3VPN outbound addresses, we extended bdrmapIT
to account for them when inferring AS ownership for the IP addresses in traceroute. This required
first using vrfinder to identify outbound addresses in the traceroute collection, changing how
bdrmapIT represents traceroute adjacencies involving outbound addresses, and modifying the
way bdrmapIT infers AS ownership for outbound addresses. Appendix A contains a complete
explanation of our approach and the extensions to bdrmapIT.
We validated the L3VPN extensions to bdrmapIT against the L3VPN ground truth described in
§6.2, using the same IPv4 and IPv6 traceroute collections as before, and included five additional
ground truth datasets to ensure that our modifications did not adversely affect ownership inferences
for inbound or off-path addresses (Table 2). The Internet2 and REANNZ datasets included addresses
used on the routers in neighboring networks to connect to the L3VPNs, and Internet2 included the
DFN addresses used on its routers as well as the addresses used on routers in other networks to
connect to the DFN. We also included the IXP participant address assignments in PeeringDB [9],
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Dataset IPv4 IPv6
bdrmapIT L3VPN Ext. Change bdrmapIT L3VPN Ext. Change
L3VPN Outbound Address Datasets
Internet2 VPN 63.4% 92.4% +29.1% 61.5% 89.2% +27.7%
REANNZ VPN 79.4% 88.9% +9.5% 72.7% 95.5% +22.7%
Normal Inbound or Off-Path Address Datasets
Internet2 DFN 96.9% 96.9% – 93.5% 93.5% –
Internet2 Neighbor 95.5% 95.8% +0.2% 92.2% 93.3% +1.1%
REANNZ Neighbor 92.3% 90.4% -1.9% 100.0% 100.0% –
IXP 92.3% 92.4% +0.1% 91.1% 91.2% +0.1%
Regex 92.7% 92.8% +0.1% 83.9% 83.9% –
Table 4. Our extensions increased router AS ownership accuracy for Internet and REANNZ L3VPN outbound
addresses, without significantly affecting the other addresses.
and adapted Hoiho [43] to generate regular expressions that extract AS ownership information
from DNS hostnames (Regex).
Table 4 shows the accuracy of our AS ownership inferences with and without the L3VPN
extensions for bdrmapIT. Our extensions improved the AS ownership accuracy for the L3VPN
outbound addresses by 9.5% – 29.1%, and produced nearly identical results for the other ground truth
datasets. Crucially, the extensions reduced the ownership accuracy only for REANNZ Neighbor
in IPv4, with one additional incorrect inference. For the other datasets, the new heuristics either
had no effect or slightly improved the accuracy of bdrmapIT’s inferences. Overall, these results
show that detecting and accounting for L3VPN outbound addresses can improve the accuracy of
AS ownership inferences for the outbound addresses.
7 CONCLUSION
Traceroute analyses, and the Internet measurements that build on them, rely on axioms, such as
which router interfaces are represented in traceroute. In this paper, we described how L3VPN exit
routers violate these axioms by reporting outbound addresses in response to traceroute probes. We
also showed that these L3VPN outbound addresses cause bdrmapIT, the state-of-the-art in router
ownership inference, to incorrectly infer router operators by violating its foundational assumptions.
These kinds of mistakes can impact a variety of Internet infrastructure research, such as causing
interdomain congestion measurement tools to incorrectly measure internal links, so we modified
bdrmapIT to account for L3VPN outbound addresses.
In 2006, Augustine et al. [20] showed that load balancing affected measured traceroute paths,
potentially confounding Internet measurements. They showed that changing Internet technologies
force us to revisit assumptions to ensure the validity of our measurements, and invented Paris
Traceroute as a way to avoid these problems. Similarly, the widespread deployment of BGP/MPLS
L3VPNs must alter the way we analyze traceroute. To that end, we presented vrfinder to detect
L3VPN outbound addresses in traceroute, so that researchers can account for them in their analyses.
We validated our approach in vrfinder with ground truth from two research and education
networks on large traceroute collections, demonstrating its reliability and coverage. We have
publicly released our vrfinder [48] and bdrmapIT [47] code so researchers can account for L3VPN
outbound addresses in their measurements and analysis. As future work we hope to use vrfinder to
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study L3VPN deployment throughout the Internet, hopefully providing a better understanding of
ISP networks and their evolution.
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A EXTENDING bdrmapIT
After identifying L3VPN outbound addresses, we extend bdrmapIT to account for them. As described
in §4.2, outbound addresses violate the assumptions in bdrmapIT, underlying decisions made
primarily when constructing the router-graph (§A.1) and annotating each router with its AS
operator (§A.2), both of which we modify here.
A.1 Modifying Graph Construction
In order to properly construct a graph that includes outbound address edges, we need to identify
not just the addresses that were outbound addresses at least once in the traceroute collection, but
also the specific interface adjacencies in the collection that involve outbound addresses. This is
difficult since some interface addresses appear in the collection as both outbound addresses and
inbound addresses. In Fig. 12, 192.0.2.13 is outbound on router 𝑅2 in Paths A and B, but inbound
in Path C.
A.1.1 Marking Forwarding Adjacencies. To avoid mistaking 192.0.2.13 for an outbound address in
Fig. 12 Path C, we need to determine when it represents an outbound address rather than an inbound
address. Complicating matters, 192.0.2.13 might not always appear prior to 192.0.2.14 when it is
an outbound address, such as in Path B, where it appears prior to the off-path address 192.0.2.25.
To account for this problem, we use the definitive instances of 192.0.2.13 as an outbound address –
when it appears immediately prior to the other side of its IP link – to determine the preceding AS
address space when 192.0.2.13 represents an outbound address. In Path A, an address from AS #A’s
address space appears before a definitive instance of the outbound address 192.0.2.13, indicating
that 192.0.2.13 is likely outbound when it follows an address from address space belonging to AS
#A.
Using this information, we mark all adjacencies leading to an outbound address as outbound
adjacencies (OA), distinguishing them from normal adjacencies when we construct edges in the
graph, and remove any adjacency going from an outbound address. Thus, we mark the adjacency
oa(192.0.2.2, 192.0.2.13) before the definitive instance of the outbound address in Fig. 12 Path
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Path A: observe inbound address on R1 and R3, and outbound address on R2, providing a definitive
instance of the outbound address 192.0.2.13. The address 192.0.2.2 comes from AS #A’s address space.
i1 i6 i7
192.0.2.2 192.0.2.13 192.0.2.14
Path B: observe inbound address on R1, outbound address on R2, and off-path address on R2. Seeing the





Path C: observe inbound address on R1, R2, R3, and 192.0.2.21 comes from AS #B’s address space. Since
we did not observe an address from AS #B’s address space prior to a definitive instance of 192.0.2.13 as an







R2 i4i6 R3 i1i3
192.0.2.12/30 192.0.2.8/30
192.0.2.13 192.0.2.10 192.0.2.9 192.0.2.2
DSTVP
i3i9
Fig. 12. We use definitive instances of an outbound address (Path A) to collect the AS address space immedi-
ately before the outbound address. We then use the prior address space to rule in outbound addresses that
appear before off-path addresses (Path B), and rule out ingress addresses (Path C).
A, and use the prior AS #A to mark oa(192.0.2.2, 192.0.2.13) in Fig. 12 Path B. We also discard
the (192.0.2.13, 192.0.2.14) and (192.0.2.13, 192.0.2.25) adjacencies. In Path C, we do not mark
(192.0.2.21, 192.0.2.13) or remove (192.0.2.13, 192.0.2.9), since AS #B never appeared before a
definitive instance of 192.0.2.13 as an outbound address .
A.1.2 Adding Forwarding Adjacencies to the Graph. Next, we use the marked adjacencies to create
OA edges in bdrmapIT’s inferred router graph, where each router represents a group of one or
more addresses on a physical router. Previously, when bdrmapIT constructed the graph, it directed
all edges from a router node to a node representing an interface seen subsequently in a traceroute.
This reflected the assumption that addresses in traceroute typically represent the inbound interface,
and therefore provide router alias constraints. Outbound addresses violate that assumption, so we
instead direct all OA edges from one router to another router, representing neighboring router
operator constraints. For outbound addresses, we rely on the assumption that routers typically
interconnect more frequently with routers operated by the same network than with routers operated
by any other single network [32].
To reflect these neighboring router constraints, in Fig. 13a we construct the edge 𝑅1
𝑂𝐴−−→ 𝑅2,
since the same network likely operates 𝑅1 and 𝑅2. We also create the edge 𝑅2
𝑂𝐴−−→ 𝑅1, instead of an
edge from 𝑅2 to 𝑅3, for the same reason. We expect that an outbound address often indicates the
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(b) OA edge from L3VPN outbound address.
Fig. 13. We create two edges (a) and (b) between routers for every OA adjacency.





Table 5. The updated edge confidence labels still prioritize nexthop edges over multihop edges, but also
prioritize normal nexthop edges over OA edges.
border of the L3VPN service provider, in which case different networks operate 𝑅2 and 𝑅3 while
the same network often operates 𝑅1 and 𝑅2.
bdrmapIT previously had two edge confidence categories, prioritizing nexthop above multihop
edges such that a router only uses its multihop edges when it has no nexthop edges. We modify
the link confidences to include OA edges, assigning a lower edge confidence to OA edges than
to normal edges, so that bdrmapIT prioritizes normal edges if available (Table 5). More precisely,
bdrmapIT only uses normal nexthop edges if available, but if we converted all of a router’s outgoing
edges into OA edges, then the router uses those edges rather than any multihop edges. Prioritizing
normal edges over outbound address edges lets bdrmapIT rely on the router alias constraints the
normal edges provide when available, and also helps prevent false router operator inferences due
to a false outbound address inference.
In Fig. 14 we extend the real example from §4.2.3 to include the traceroute segments in Figs. 14b
and 14c. Here, vrfinder identified 72.14.209.107 as an outbound address, so we create the OA link
from 𝑅1 to the outbound address. Since 𝑅1 still has a normal outgoing edge (Fig. 14d), bdrmapIT
will only use that edge during router annotation. bdrmapIT also discards the edge from 𝑅2 to
72.14.209.106, redirecting it as a OA edge to 𝑅1 instead (Fig. 14e).
A.2 Modifying Router Annotation
When relying on OA edges, bdrmapIT determines router ownership using neighboring router
constraints, but still benefits from bdrmapIT’s iterative constraint satisfaction. bdrmapIT primarily
annotates routers with their AS operator by selecting the most frequent AS among the constraints,
and we do the same here, since we want to determine the most frequent AS operator of neighboring
routers. We annotate OA routers in a separate step after annotating normal routers, allowing the
neighboring router constraints to leverage normal router annotations.
A.2.1 Annotating IRs with OA Edges. Algorithm 1 describes the technique for annotating routers
relying on OA edges. Similar to bdrmapIT, we use votes to represent the constraints. Each router
connected by an outgoing OA edge votes with its current AS annotation, reflecting the current
router operator inference for that router. We try to rely only on votes from neighboring routers with
normal outgoing edges if possible. Thus, if the router has any outgoing edges to normal routers,
we use only those votes when selecting the most frequent AS. Otherwise, we add a vote for each
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(d) Pruned OA edge.
R1i1 R2 i5
OA
(e) Redirected OA edge.
Fig. 14. Network topology based on ground truth from Internet2. From the traceroutes in (b) and (c), we
create the OA links in (d) and (e).
of the router interface origin ASes, and use all of the neighboring AS votes in the election. The
origin ASes for the router represent traditional router alias constraints, and provide potential AS
operators for the router in addition to the neighboring router AS operators.
Next, we use the election to select the most frequent AS among the votes. First, we filter the
votes to only include ASes that have a relationship with a router origin AS, and the router origin
ASes themselves. This helps ensure that the selected AS directly connects to a router origin AS.
When none of the neighboring router ASes have a relationship with a router origin AS, we revert
to using all the votes, as this might indicate incomplete AS relationships inferred from BGP paths.
We then use whatever votes remain to annotate the router with the AS receiving the most votes,
breaking ties using the number of direct and indirect transit customers to select the likely customer
AS, relying on the technique by Luckie et al. [44] to infer AS relationships from BGP AS paths. We
use the same tiebreak as bdrmapIT, since we expect that the addresses for L3VPN interconnections
between a service provider and a customer typically come from the provider’s address space.
Returning to the real example (Fig. 15), we use the modified graph to annotate the routers with
their AS operators. We annotate 𝑅1 in the first step, using only the normal nexthop edge. Finally,
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Algorithm 1 Annotating L3VPN Router, 𝑟
1: 𝑉 : counter for AS votes
2: 𝑁 : counter for normal router votes
3: for all router 𝑗 ∈ subseqent[𝑟 ] do
4: 𝑎 ← annotation[ 𝑗 ]
5: if 𝑎 != NULL then
6: increment(𝑉 [𝑎])
7: if j has normal edges then increment(𝑁 [𝑎])
8: for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑟 .interfaces do increment(𝑉 [𝑖 .as])
9: if 𝑁 is not empty then𝑉 ← 𝑁
10: 𝑅 ← 𝑟 .origins ∪ {𝑣 ∈ 𝑉 | ∃𝑖 ∈ 𝑟 .origins : rel(𝑜, 𝑣) }
11: if 𝑅 != 𝑟 .origins then 𝑎 ← max
𝑣∈𝑅
𝑉 [𝑣 ]
12: else 𝑎 ← max
𝑣∈𝑉
𝑉 [𝑣 ]









(b) Step 2: OA routers.
Fig. 15. In the first stage of router annotation (a), we annotate 𝑅1 using its normal edge, leading to the correct
annotation for 𝑅2 in the second stage (b).
in the step that annotates OA routers, using the reversed OA edge, we rely on the inferred AS
operator for 𝑅1 to correctly determine that Internet2 operates 𝑅2.
A.2.2 Annotation Flapping. Relying on router annotations for OA edges can lead to router annota-
tion flapping when they point to another router that relies on OA edges. To avoid this, we annotate
the routers that rely on OA edges in a fixed order, and use annotations from the same iteration of
the loop. We first sort the routers in descending order by the number of outgoing edges, since we
expect more reliable annotations for routers with more outgoing edges. If two routers have the
same number of edges, then we break ties using the smallest number of direct and indirect transit
customers among the router origin ASes. This full ordering of OA routers prevents annotation
flapping and ensures that bdrmapIT always outputs the same annotations for the same input.
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